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The holder of a bank card, Bernt Petter Jørgensen, had 
two shoulder bags stolen on Saturday 4 August 2001. The 
theft took place between the hours of 15:00 and 15:20 pm 
while Jørgensen was loading his luggage into a rental car 
after arriving at Alicante Airport in Spain. The shoulder 
bags contained, amongst other things, a wallet containing 
several credit cards. In addition to the credit cards, two 
mobile telephones, airline tickets, keys, and cash were 
also stolen.
Jørgensen was robbed of six cards, and his wife was 
robbed of four such cards. Two of the cards were used 
without authority. This case concerns a particular card, a 
Cresco Card (hereinafter ‘the card’). The second card was 
issued by Nordea (Kreditkassen). Regarding the misuse of 
the second card, the issue has been settled with the bank, 
the bank having accepted Jørgensen’s explanation.
The loss of the card at issue was detected immediately. 
However, the parties disagree about who was responsible 
for failing to bar the card from being used until Tuesday 
7 August 2001. There were a total of four debits on the 
Cresco card, with a total amount of kr 9,628. The debits 
were made on Saturday 4 August 2001 at 16:13, 16:14, 
16:15 and 16:19 including debits of kr 2,407. Prior to 
these charges, the card was last used at Torp airport in 
Sandefjord where withdrawals occurred in connection 
with the flight to Spain.
The Board of Bank Complaints for Consumers in Banking 
(Bankklagendmnda) considered the case on 20 June 
2002. The majority, consisting of three of the five 
members, stated, amongst other things, that they:
‘[Board of Bank Complaints] Find that the case should 
be considered on its merits and refer to the rationale 
of the earlier cases, BKN 2001-017 and 2001-052 BKN. 
It appears from the information in the present case 
that the payment card was used with a PIN code, and 
the correct code, according to the information, was 
entered on the first try, just shortly after the card 
holder’s wallet was stolen, containing the respective 
card. The card holder himself made withdrawals with 
the card, the last time at Torp airport in Sandefjord, 
before the theft took place. The majority found that the 
unauthorized user of the card did not discover the code 
when the card holder withdrew the funds. Following 
a review of events as stated, the board’s majority 
finds that it is most likely that the code, possibly in 
a poorly disguised form, was stolen along with the 
card from the card holder’s wallet. This is contrary to 
the card holder’s recollection. The misappropriation 
is considered to be possible because of the gross 
negligence of the card holder, and the bank can 
hold the card holder responsible for kr 8,000 of the 
unauthorized withdrawal amount, for which see the 
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Law of Financial Contracts § 35 (2) point a and the 
current account policies section 5a. The majority point 
out that it cannot be assumed that the abuse took 
place after the card was reported lost. Thus, BBS was 
contacted by the complainant’s assistant at 13.28 on 
the day of the loss. The Bank Board of Complaints 
(hereinafter “Board”) also refers to the card holder’s 
verification he has obtained from LOfavør StopService 
that his LOfavør MasterCard was blocked at 16.10 on 
the day of the loss, before the misuse started. The 
card holder has stated that his assistant in Norway 
requested that the relevant payment card be blocked, 
which it was not. As the case appears, the relevant 
payment card was not reported to LOfavør StopService, 
which under the terms of the agreement was an 
essential requirement. Reporting the card as stolen 
was necessary for the center to block the card in the 
matter in dispute.’
In accordance with the majority’s view, the case was 
decided with the following conclusion:
“The bank can hold the card holder liable for kr 8,000 
for misuse of his credit card.”
The two members representing the minority of the board 
would dismiss the case because they believed there was 
insufficient information for the case to be heard on its 
merits.
Jørgensen filed a complaint at the Trondheim District 
Court on 13 May 2004, and the defendant’s response 
was received on 7 June 2004. Thereafter, Jørgensen filed 
pleadings on 25 June, 5, 20 and 25 August, and 20 and 21 
September 2004. The defendant filed response pleadings 
on 7 June, 16 July 15 and 21 September 2004. The 
Trondheim District Court heard the case under the rules 
for simplified proceedings set out in the Civil Procedure 
Act § 322.
Pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, § 322a third 
sentence, Jørgensen requested an oral proceeding. This 
was held in Trondheim court on 22 September 2004. In 
addition to the plaintiff, a total of 7 witnesses provided 
testimony.
 
The plaintiff has essentially argued as follows: 
Jørgensen did not keep the PIN with the card. The codes 
were written down, and were in his safe at his residence. 
Jørgensen maintains that he has no trouble remembering 
the codes, which he had memorized. From Jørgensen’s 
point of view, his actions are not blameworthy.
Several similar episodes have been featured in the 
media, and one must take as a fact that PIN codes can be 
broken by the use of advanced computer equipment. It 
also appears that there have been a number of such cases 
brought before the Board (Bankklagendmnda) and the 
courts. It appears unreasonable that so many people are 
certain that they have kept their card and code in such a 
way that others will easily be able to acquire it.
It is difficult for card holders to substantiate that they 
have not kept the card and code together, and the banks 
have not used any resources to prevent the abuse of cards 
when stolen.
DnB NOR Bank ASA has the burden of proof, and it 
should be the bank’s risk that it is not known how the 
thieves made the withdrawals.
Jørgensen believes that there is such doubt about the 
events that it cannot be assumed that he has acted with 
gross negligence.
In addition, it is submitted that Jørgensen gave notice 
of the loss in time. Efforts to get transactions blocked 
started immediately and he declared that his EuroCard 
and LOfavør MasterCard were locked at 4:10 on the day of 
the loss. That the bank failed to block the card in a timely 
manner, must be the responsibility of DnB NOR Bank ASA.
The plaintiff has submitted the following claims for relief:
1. Cresco is ordered to pay kr 8,000 to Bernt Petter 
Jørgensen with the addition of the general penalty, 
including 12% interest before 1 January 2004, and 
9.25% interest after 1 January 2004, from 1 September 
2001 until payment is made.
2. Bernt Petter Jørgensen is awarded legal costs with 
additional penalty interest from the judgment until 
fulfillment of the payment.
The defendant makes the following argument: 
DnB NOR Bank ASA (hereinafter called the bank) believes 
it is the claimant that has the burden of proof, thus 
requiring Jørgensen, who claims that he has not been 
grossly negligent, to substantiate this claim. Further, 
the bank believes that it has substantiated that the card 
holder was substantially grossly negligence. The bank 
maintains that the card holder did not report the theft in 
a timely manner. It appears that the message to block the 
account was first registered on Tuesday 7 August 2001.
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The thief used the correct PIN. This suggests that 
Jørgensen, the card owner, kept the code with the card. 
When the misuse of the card occurred, the card holder’s 
PIN was correctly entered on the first try. The complainant 
has thus been grossly negligent.
Copying the magnetic stripe is a known problem for the 
bank and both software and technical devices for such 
copies can be purchased in specialty shops. However, 
the copy has the same PIN code as the original. It is not 
possible to ‘crack’ the PIN on the card given to Jørgensen.
It is unlikely that someone who travelled on the same 
flight from Torp to Alicante would observe that Jørgensen 
entered the code at the outlet at Torp. There are no other 
likely causes of the abuse, other than the card holder kept 
the code with the card. 
The defendant has submitted the following plea:
1. DnB NOR Bank ASA is acquitted.
2. DnB NOR Bank ASA is awarded costs plus the general 
judgment will accrue from the fulfillment of payment.
The court notes:
The claim was made against Cresco Kredittkort AS. The 
statement was later corrected to DnB Nor Bank ASA.
Regarding the court’s competence, it is noted that it is 
not the correct geographical venue for the case. DnB 
NOR Bank ASA has been notified that the writ names 
the incorrect defendant. However, no objections were 
filed either against the defendant when the entity was 
changed, or the court’s competence. The court considers 
that the party designation in this particular case can 
be corrected. It is referred to the structural changes 
that have taken place on the defendant’s side, see the 
Civil Procedure Act § 97. DnB NOR Bank ASA have also 
explicitly agreed that they are the appropriate defendant 
in the case.
Furthermore, the parties met for negotiations without any 
objections against the court’s (geographical) competence. 
The court sees itself competent to decide the case, see 
Civil Procedure Act § 92.
The parties have devoted some attention to the question 
regarding who has the burden of proving that Jørgensen 
acted with gross negligence. The court will first consider 
this question.
The court refers to the general rules of the burden of 
proof, and refers specifically to Ot. Prp. (1998-99) no. 41 
on page 44 which states:
‘It should be stressed that even without a rule of a 
statutory burden of proof, a tribunal or a court cannot 
assume that the customer has acted with gross 
negligence unless there is specific evidence of this. 
That the PIN code has been used and the customer has 
no explanation on how the code became known to the 
unauthorized persons, cannot be sufficient to assume 
that the customer acted with gross negligence and 
impose responsibility.’
The court also believes it will be in error to require 
the card holder to prove that he did not act with gross 
negligence. The court believes that the bank has the 
burden of proving that Jørgensen acted with gross 
negligence in connection with unauthorized uses that 
have been made with his bank card.
The Court then turns to the more substantive issues.
The Law of Financial Contracts § 35, second paragraph 
provides as follows:
The account holder is liable for up to kr 8,000 for 
losses caused by the unauthorized use of payment 
cards if
a) the account holder or a person the credit card has 
been given to by gross negligence has made the 
abuse possible, or
b) the abuse is made possible because the account 
holder or a person the credit card has been given 
to has failed to notify the institution as soon as 
possible after discovering the loss of the credit 
card or within reasonable time after this should 
have been discovered.
The provision is written so that the bank is entitled to 
charge the account holder up to kr 8,000 for losses 
caused by unlawful use of his credit card, if the abuse is 
made possible by gross negligence of the account holder, 
or if the account holder has failed to notify the bank as 
soon as possible after learning the payment card has 
been lost.
First, the court will consider Jørgensen’s claim that he 
notified the bank within a reasonable time of the stolen 
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card, see the Law of Financial Contracts § 35, second 
paragraph, letter b. On this point, the court takes the 
same position as the board (Bankklagenemnda).
The court believes that Jørgensen did not notify the 
bank of the loss in time, showing that the stolen card 
was not enrolled in the blocking scheme under LOfavør 
StopService. The court cannot see any failure of the bank 
in this context and finds that it cannot be determined 
that Jørgensen was informed that the card was included 
in the Lofavør Stop Service arrangement, or that he had 
reasonable grounds to believe it.
The court finds that BBS was notified of the first block at 
18:28 on the day of the loss, after the unauthorized use of 
the card took place. The other cards were locked at 16:10. 
The court notes that this assessment is not required for 
a finding of gross negligence. The court further refers 
to the board’s review, provided above, which this court 
endorses.
The court then turns to the question of whether the 
conditions for gross negligence, as required in the Law of 
Financial Contracts § 35, second paragraph letter a, have 
been fulfilled.
By Supreme Court judgment in Rt 2004 page 499, premise 
32, is quoted:
‘The Supreme Court’s judgment rendered in Rt-1989-
1318, stated that gross negligence must represent a 
substantial departure from the usual prudent course of 
action, and that it must be about a performance which 
is highly blameworthy, for which he is substantially 
more to blame than under the question of ordinary 
negligence. The case referenced considered liability 
insurance. I refer you on to Rt-1995-486 where it was 
referred to the judgment of 1989. Also in the legislative 
history of the provision in the Financial Contracts § 35, 
NOU 1994:19 page 144, it is stated that a substantial 
departure from the usual prudent course of action for 
any act or failure to qualify for gross negligence. I put 
this as a basis for further discussion …’
The court assesses Jørgensen’s actions.
The court has considered a number of possible events. 
The court is of the opinion that it appears very unlikely 
that Jørgensen actively took part in the misuse of the card. 
The bank does not dispute this point. The court does not 
believe or find evidence that Jørgensen gave the code to 
others and that they in turn obtained access to the account 
in question. The bank is in agreement on this point.
The court also notes that someone entering the correct 
code on his or her first attempt, by pure guesswork, is 
also highly unlikely.
Another possibility that has been promoted is that prior 
to departure, someone saw Jørgensen enter his PIN when 
withdrawing funds at Torp airport in Sandefjord and this 
passenger, also on the flight to Spain, committed the theft 
and subsequent unauthorized use. The court believes that 
this appears to be a highly unlikely sequence of events, 
particularly in light of the fact that one of the other cards 
subject to unauthorized use was not in use at Torp airport.
It remains for the two other possible events, and it is 
these events that the parties have devoted the most 
attention. One option is that Jørgensen kept the code 
with the card in such form that it was possible for others 
to acquire the code. The second of the remaining options 
is that someone managed to ‘break’ the PIN on the card 
and then make withdraws. It is hard to imagine any other 
realistic sequence of events.
For the court, the question of whether a PIN code can 
be cracked was at the heart of the matter, and we now 
consider this.
The court understands that the PIN is not stored in the 
card. The card has a verification value. When the code is 
entered at the terminal, a complicated process is started, 
and there is a (de) cryption/cryptographic calculation in 
the interaction between the outlet terminal and a remote 
central computer that is connected on-line. The result of 
this process is that the code is either approved or denied, 
but other possibilities exist.
Central to the security system appears to the court to be 
what is called the DES system. This algorithm is a system 
for encryption of ‘keys’ used in several areas. This is 
related to the process that is achieved to demonstrate 
whether the key code is correct or not.
It appears uncertain whether the current board used 
the double or triple DES system. Double DES has a 
substantially lower level of security than triple DES. The 
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uncertainty associated with the card’s security is related 
to the issue date. In this respect, the security of the card 
seems to be crucial.
The parties agree that the card was issued between 1 and 
15 February 2000. At that time, the bank upgraded the 
systems without knowing whether the stolen card had 
been upgraded or not. The witness Haugstad explained 
to the court that all cards of the type Jørgensen was 
in possession of, which had an expiration date of the 
fourth month of 2001, should have been equipped with 
triple-DES. The misused card, expiring in February 2002, 
would have been equipped with triple-DES. As the court 
understands it, and based on Sundby’s testimony, the 
upgrade process and the security could be different 
depending on which part of the card is in question, and 
there are other uncertainties associated with the current 
card’s security. It is also unclear how the upgrade process 
took place. The court finds, therefore, with some doubt 
it must assume that the worst of these systems (double 
DES) was in place on Jørgensen’s stolen Cresco card.
At significant points, there is no correlation between the 
statements that the expert witnesses have given. The 
witness Arnesen argues that it is generally known that 
the double-DES system has known vulnerabilities and 
PINs that are associated with this system can be ‘cracked’ 
within seconds or minutes. This can also be accomplished 
by relatively unprofessional people. Supporting this point 
is a judgment from a German court, and also testimony 
from an individual claiming to have ‘broken’ a PIN in 1998 
(see German sentence of Amtsretten in Darmstadt, dated 
24 February 1989). In the instant case, the court does not 
find any reason to put evidentiary weight on the latter two 
evidentiary offerings. The witness Tønnesen also believes 
that PINs can be ‘broken’ so that cards can be used within 
a very short time frame.
Arnesen believes that the triple-DES system, which is in 
use today in practice, will not be broken even with a very 
long time period and a high level of data capacity. She is 
not aware that anyone has managed to ‘break’ the code in 
the triple DES system.
The witness Sundby believes that PINs on cards with the 
double (simple) DES system, which are now replaced 
by the triple DES, could be broken in less than a day, 
provided that the person breaking the card had significant 
computing power available to them. Also testifying, 
Haugstad believe that if it is possible to ‘crack’ a PIN 
under the former security level. However, Haugstad 
maintains that this would take a very long time, longer 
than the time in question in the present case.
The experts also disagree about whether the effort to 
‘crack’ the code needs to be done after receipt of the 
actual card or not. The witness Arnesen believes much 
of the work can be done in advance and that it then will 
only take seconds or minutes to ‘crack’ the code after 
obtaining a card. The witness Sundby says work cannot 
commence until the card is obtained.
The court finds the circumstances are such that it can 
be assumed that it is most likely that a person has 
to have the card in their possession before the work 
begins, and thus that it necessarily takes a fair amount 
of time between when a card is obtained by a thief to 
the point that a PIN can be found. Anything else would, 
among other things, mean that there would be ‘copying 
machines’ for ‘buckling’ of PINs that anyone with such 
a motive could use if they had another card in their 
possession. The court reasons that the work must 
have been performed after having obtained the card, 
regardless of whether it involves simple, double or triple 
DES.  However, the court considers it unrealistic, that 
within a practical time frame (i.e. the card’s two year 
validity period), the triple DES can be broken.
The court is of the opinion that it is probable that it will 
take a relatively long time to ‘break’ a PIN that has the 
double DES system, and that in any case it would take 
more than an hour or two.
It is assumed that the standard security systems that 
are used are effective. However, according to Jørgensen, 
no cases have been documented that demonstrate the 
implementation of the systems are secure.
The court refers in this respect to the fact that banks are 
subject to supervision and operate a comprehensive 
internal control work, and the witness Haugstad’s 
explanation that both the standards and the practical 
implementation are revised thoroughly and regularly. In 
that regard, Haugestad explained that the systems are 
subject to annual audits. The Banks Control Center (BSK), 
in addition to the major international card companies, 
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conducts such audits.
The court does not find that there is reason to accept 
that the banks’ security systems are in doubt. Although 
the implementation of a system necessarily involves 
opportunities for errors, the court cannot see that this 
involves significant practical risk for customers with cards.
The Financial Supervisory Authority issued a statement 
dated 20 August 2002 stating that they cannot see 
that there is any doubt regarding the bank’s note of 3 
December 1993 that PIN codes cannot be ‘broken’. The 
statements contained are not new, but they have not been 
withdrawn or replaced by new statements. The view thus 
appears to be in force. However, the court does not know, 
as the plaintiff has pointed out, the background material 
for these statements.
The court believes, however, contrary to the plaintiff’s 
claims, that it has, on occasion, to express that the bank 
has not done a complete evaluation or does not have 
sufficient expertise in this area. The court has been 
provided with a letter from the Oslo Police District to 
the Complaints Board dated 11 June 2003 where it is 
expressed that they are of the opinion that PINs cannot be 
‘broken’.
However, considering all of the expert witnesses, 
expressing that PINs subject to the double-DES system 
(no longer in use today) can be broken, provided that 
the party has sufficient time and computing power. The 
statements from the Financial Supervisory Authority, 
the Central Bank and the Oslo police will probably be 
understood with these reservations.
Banks are further subject to the supervision of the 
Commission and self-control, including the Banks’ 
Standardization Office, and international card security 
requirements.
The court believes that, contrary to the arguments of 
the plaintiff, that the time factor is relevant. The misuse 
of the card took place about one hour after the cards 
were stolen. The authorization log shows, together 
with response codes, the correct PIN was used in the 
first attempt (response code 00 and not 55), and that 
this applies to all four outlets in question. This provides 
concrete evidence of the alternate sequence of events 
that the code was readily available and that it therefore 
must have been kept with the card, or in disguised form 
so it was natural for others to be able to connect the card 
and code in a short time.
On the last attempt to withdraw the funds, the transaction 
was rejected because the amount available in the account 
was exceeded (response code 61 in the authorization log). 
The court does not find that there is reason to question 
the accuracy of the information in the authorization log, as 
the plaintiff argues.
It must seem obvious that any system of this type will 
have risk factors relating to safety. There will always be 
a theoretical possibility that a PIN can be ‘broken’. The 
court finds in the present case it is likely that the code 
on the card cannot be ‘broken’ within the time period 
available in the instant case.
As a result, there is only one possible alternative option 
available.
The court concludes that there is no other explanation 
that can be considered a reasonable explanation under 
the circumstances, other than that the PIN was stored 
with the card. The court finds  that the standard of proof 
is met by DnB NOR Bank ASA as required in the legislative 
history discussed above and upon which the court has 
based its assessment.
The court finds that it is probable, based on specific 
indications, that Jørgensen kept the code with the card, 
and that this made it possible for unauthorized access to 
take place a very shortly after the card was stolen. There 
are circumstances that the case law falls under the term 
of gross negligence. For the record, it is emphasized that 
there are no such circumstances in our case as provided in 
Rt 2004 page 499.
The fact that Jørgensen was very familiar with the 
regulations for the storage of cards and codes, including 
card rules, is not disputed. The court chooses not to 
consider this issue further.
Costs:
DnB NOR Bank ASA prevails in full. The main rule in this 
situation is that Jørgensen be required to pay all legal 
costs, for which see the Civil Procedure Act § 172 first 
paragraph.
The court, however, finds reason to apply the exception 
in the Civil Procedure Act § 172, second paragraph. This 
is because there is actual doubt regarding the specific 
course of events.
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Although the court found it likely that there was gross 
negligence based on the plaintiff’s actions, there is 
also reasonable doubt in relation to the opportunity to 
‘breaking’ the PIN of the card if it is assumed that the 
card had a lower security level than is currently being 
used. It appears in this respect from a number of witness 
statements that suggest that the PINs used in this earlier 
system could be ‘broken’. The testimony, however, differs 
markedly among others in terms of how long it would take 
to ‘crack’ a PIN with the card security protections used in 
2001.
The court believes that the requirements of the Civil 
Procedure Act § 172, second paragraph are met by ‘the 
matter was so questionable, that there was good reason’ 
for taking legal action.
The court is of the opinion that Jørgensen should not be 
required to pay DnB NOR Bank ASA’s legal costs. The 
parties shall bear their own costs.
Rendition:
1. The court finds for DnB NOR Bank ASA.
2. The parties shall bear their own costs.
***
The court adjourned
Leif O. Østerbø Judge
The verdict can be appealed to the High Court. The appeal 
must be declared directly to the district court within one 
month after the sentence has been served. If the appeal 
concerns a capital value below 50,000 kroner, it cannot 
be brought without the consent of the Court of Appeal. 
Application for consent in such cases must be submitted 
simultaneously with the appeal statement.
Simultaneously with the appeal statement, the appellant 
must pay the appeal fee, which is 24 times the court fee. If 
the trial has lasted more than a day, it incurs an additional 
fee. If the appeal fee is not paid within the appeal 
deadline, the appeal is deemed as not filed.
The declaration of appeal must be signed or co-signed 
by an attorney. The appellant may also contact the court 
office will appeal the declaration written and signed there.
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